Secure boot with resistance to differential power analysis and other external monitoring attacks
US-2016048684-A1 · Feb 18, 2016 · US
US11601287B2 · US · B2
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Publication number | US-11601287-B2 |
| Application number | US-202117203560-A |
| Country | US |
| Kind code | B2 |
| Filing date | Mar 16, 2021 |
| Priority date | Jan 10, 2016 |
| Publication date | Mar 7, 2023 |
| Grant date | Mar 7, 2023 |
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Official abstract text for this publication.
Techniques are disclosed relating to the secure communication of devices. In one embodiment, a first device is configured to perform a pairing operation with a second device to establish a secure communication link between the first device and the second device. The pairing operation includes receiving firmware from the second device to be executed by the first device during communication over the secure communication link, and in response to a successful verification of the firmware, establishing a shared encryption key to be used by the first and second devices during the communication. In some embodiments, the pairing operation includes receiving a digital signature created from a hash value of the firmware and a public key of the second device, and verifying the firmware by extracting the hash value from the digital signature and comparing the extracted hash value with a hash value of the received firmware.
Opening claim text (preview).
What is claimed is: 1. A first device, comprising: one or more processors; and memory having program instructions stored therein that are executable by the one or more processors to cause the first device to: perform a pairing operation with a second device, wherein performing the pairing operation includes: using a trusted computing system to obtain a signed version of a package that includes first data about the second device; sending the signed version of the package to the second device; receiving, from the second device, second data, the second data being sent by the second device in response to receiving the signed version of the package; and establishing a secure communication link with the second device using the second data. 2. The first device of claim 1 , wherein the package includes a first public key of the first device. 3. The first device of claim 2 , wherein the second data includes a second public key associated with the second device, the second public key being usable by the first device to establish a shared key with the second device. 4. The first device of claim 1 , wherein the program instructions are further executable to cause the first device to: perform an authentication of a user based on biometric data collected by a biosensor of the second device. 5. The first device of claim 1 , wherein using the trusted computing system includes: sending, to the trusted computing system via a network, a request that includes the first data; and wherein the trusted computing system is a separate device that is trusted by both the first and second devices. 6. The first device of claim 1 , wherein the first data includes information indicative of an identity of the first device and data provided by the second device. 7. The first device of claim 6 , wherein the information indicative of the identity of the first device includes a hash value of firmware for the second device. 8. The first device of claim 7 , wherein the data provided by the second device includes a nonce and an epoch value. 9. The first device of claim 1 , wherein the program instructions are further executable to cause the first device to: request firmware from the trusted computing system in response to a determination that the first device does not currently store a suitable version of the firmware. 10. The first device of claim 1 , wherein the program instructions are further executable to cause the first device to: receive a token from the second device; store the received token with a hardware identifier for the second device; and use the token to expedite a subsequent pairing operation with the second device. 11. A second device, comprising: one or more processors; memory having program instructions stored therein that are executable by the one or more processors to cause the second device to: perform a pairing operation with a first device, wherein performing the pairing operation includes: receiving, by the second device, a signed version of a package that includes first data relating to the second device, wherein the signed version of the package is signed with a signature of a trusted computing system; verifying the signature of the trusted computing system; and in response to successful verification of the signature of the trusted computing system, establishing, using the first data, a secure communication link with the first device, wherein the establishing includes sending second data to the first device. 12. The second device of claim 11 , wherein the first data includes a first public key of the first device, and wherein the second data includes a second public key of the second device. 13. The second device of claim 11 , wherein the first data includes a signed firmware hash value and firmware, and wherein verifying the signature includes comparing the signed firmware hash value with a hash value computed by the second device based on the received firmware. 14. The second device of claim 13 , wherein the first data includes a first epoch value, and wherein verifying the signature includes updating a stored epoch value with the first epoch value, and confirming that the received firmware is in compliance with the first epoch value. 15. The second device of claim 11 , wherein the program instructions are further executable to cause the second device to: facilitate performance of a user authentication by using a biosensor to collect biometric data from a user. 16. The second device of claim 15 , wherein the program instructions are further executable to cause the second device to: provide the biometric data to the first device via the established secure communication link. 17. The second device of claim 12 , wherein establishing the secure communication link includes using the second public key and a private key paired with the first public key to generate a shared key to be used in exchanging encrypted information. 18. A method, comprising: receiving, by a trusted computing system, a request for a signature from a first device, wherein the request includes first data about a second device for performing a pairing operation between the first device and the second device; verifying, by the trusted computing system, the first data; and in response to a successful verification of the first data, providing, by the trusted computing system, the requested signature to the first device, wherein the first device is configured to send a package signed with the signature to the second device, the second device being configured to verify the signature and send second data to the first device in order to establish a secure communication link. 19. The method of claim 18 , wherein the first data includes a first public key of the first device, and wherein the second data includes a second public key of the second device. 20. The method of claim 18 , wherein verifying the first data includes determining whether the first device is permitted to pair with the second device.
Secure pairing of devices · CPC title
using DSA or related signature schemes, e.g. elliptic based signatures, ElGamal or Schnorr schemes · CPC title
using biometrical features, e.g. fingerprint, retina-scan (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication using biological data H04L9/3231) · CPC title
for key exchange, e.g. in peer-to-peer networks (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for key agreement H04L9/0838) · CPC title
using techniques specially adapted for alterable solid state memories, e.g. for EEPROM or flash memories · CPC title
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