Verification of biometric templates for privacy preserving authentication

Patent metadata

Field	Value
Publication number	US-11546164-B2
Application number	US-202017079279-A
Country	US
Kind code	B2
Filing date	Oct 23, 2020
Priority date	Oct 23, 2020
Publication date	Jan 3, 2023
Grant date	Jan 3, 2023

Abstract

Secure protocols for external-facing authentication are provided for both user templates stored on their devices and the biometric measurement captured by external sensors of an access device. The protocols provide different levels of security, ranging from passive security with some leakage to active security with no leakage. A packing technique is also provided. Zero-knowledge techniques are used during enrollment to validate a norm of user templates and knowledge of the plaintext biometric template. One enrolled, the verifier can sign the encrypted template for use in a later matching phase with an access device.

First claim

What is claimed is:

1. A method of registering a biometric stored on a user device with a verifier device using a first modulus N and a second modulus {circumflex over (N)}, the method comprising performing by the user device:
providing, to the verifier device, an encrypted biometric vector c stored on the user device, the encrypted biometric vector c generated by encrypting a biometric vector x using a user public key, wherein the user public key includes the first modulus N, wherein a user secret key corresponds to the user public key;
receiving, from the verifier device, a challenge message including a masked encrypted biometric vector |w|, an encrypted first cancellation value |v|, an encrypted second cancellation value |{circumflex over (v)}|, and the second modulus {circumflex over (N)}, wherein the first cancellation value v is an aggregation of first terms, including values of the encrypted biometric vector c and at least with a first random value β, and wherein the second cancellation value {circumflex over (v)} is an aggregation of second terms, including values of the encrypted biometric vector c and at least a second random value {circumflex over (β)}, and wherein the encrypted second cancellation value |{circumflex over (v)}| is generated using the second modulus {circumflex over (N)};
decrypting, using the user secret key, the masked encrypted biometric vector |w|, to obtain a masked biometric vector w, the encrypted first cancellation value |v| to obtain a first cancellation value v, and the encrypted second cancellation value |{circumflex over (v)}| to obtain a second cancellation value {circumflex over (v)};
generating a first challenge response z using the first cancellation value v and a first function of the masked biometric vector w, the first function including a modulus N;
generating a second challenge response {circumflex over (z)} using the second cancellation value {circumflex over (v)} and a second function of the masked biometric vector w, the second function including the second modulus {circumflex over (N)}; and
providing, to the verifier device, the first challenge response z and the second challenge response {circumflex over (z)}, thereby enabling the verifier device to validate that the first challenge response z matches a public value y using the first modulus N and to validate that the second challenge response {circumflex over (z)} matches the public value y using the second modulus {circumflex over (N)}.

2. The method of claim 1 , wherein each value of the masked encrypted biometric vector |w| is generated by applying a respective masking function to a corresponding value of the encrypted biometric vector c.

3. The method of claim 2 , wherein the respective masking function is a linear function and includes a random authenticating value α that scales the corresponding value of the encrypted biometric vector c and an offset random value of a random vector ρ.

4. The method of claim 1 , wherein the first function results in one or more first cross terms, wherein a portion of the first cancellation value v cancels out the one or more first cross terms, and wherein the second function results in one or more second cross terms, wherein a portion of the second cancellation value {circumflex over (v)} cancels out the one or more second cross terms.

5. The method of claim 1 , wherein the first challenge response z matches a first combination of the public value y, a random authenticating value α, and a first random value β, the first combination being determined mod N, and wherein the second challenge response {circumflex over (z)} matches a second combination of the public value y, the random authenticating value α, and a second random value {circumflex over (β)}, the second combination being determined mod {circumflex over (N)}.

6. The method of claim 1 , wherein the second modulus {circumflex over (N)} is a prime number that is less than the first modulus N.

7. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:
receiving a signature of the encrypted biometric vector c; and
providing, to an access device having a biometric sensor, the signature as part of a matching phase with the access device to obtain access to a resource.

8. The method of claim 7 , further comprising, as part of the matching phase:
sending the user public key and the encrypted biometric vector c to the access device;
receiving a first message from the access device, the first message including an encrypted similarity metric, the encrypted similarity metric computed with the encrypted biometric vector c and a biometric measurement using homomorphic encryption with the user public key, the encrypted similarity metric corresponding to a similarity metric encrypted with the user public key, the biometric measurement obtained by the biometric sensor;
decrypting the encrypted similarity metric to obtain a decrypted similarity metric; and
sending a response message to the access device, the response message indicating whether the decrypted similarity metric exceeds a threshold.

9. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:
encrypting, using the user public key, a random value s using a random value u to obtain an encrypted mask |s;u|, wherein the encrypted biometric vector c is generated using a random vector r;
sending, to the verifier device, the encrypted mask |s;u|;
receiving, from the verifier device, a random challenge vector e;
determining a first response by aggregating the random value s and an inner product of the biometric vector x and the random challenge vector e;
determining a second response using the random vector r, the random challenge vector e, a generator g of the user public key, the first modulus N, and the first response; and
sending the first response and the second response to the verifier device.

10. A method of registering a biometric of a user device with a verifier device using a first modulus N and a second modulus {circumflex over (N)}, the method comprising performing by the verifier device:
receiving, from the user device, an encrypted biometric vector c, the encrypted biometric vector c generated by encrypting a biometric vector x using a user public key, wherein the user public key includes the first modulus N;
generating a masked encrypted biometric vector |w| by applying a respective masking function to each value of the encrypted biometric vector c;
generating an encrypted first cancellation value |v| by aggregating first terms, including values of the encrypted biometric vector c and a first mask value;
generating an encrypted second cancellation value |{circumflex over (v)}| by aggregating second terms, including values of the encrypted biometric vector c and a second mask value;
sending, to the user device, a challenge message including the masked encrypted biometric vector |w|, the encrypted first cancellation value |v|, and the encrypted second cancellation value |{circumflex over (v)}|;
receiving, from the user device, a first challenge response z and a second challenge response {circumflex over (z)};
validating that the first challenge response z matches a public value y using the first modulus N; and
validate that the second challenge response {circumflex over (z)} matches the public value y using the second modulus {circumflex over (N)}.

11. The method of claim 10 , wherein each value of the masked encrypted biometric vector |w| is generated by applying a respective masking function to a corresponding value of the encrypted biometric vector c.

12. The method of claim 11 , wherein the respective masking function is a linear function and includes a random authenticating value α that scales the corresponding value of the

Assignees

• Visa Int Service Ass

Inventors

• Badrinarayanan Saikrishna
• Rindal Peter
• Mukherjee Pratyay

Classifications

• H04L9/008

  involving homomorphic encryption · CPC title

• H04L9/3218 Primary

  using proof of knowledge, e.g. Fiat-Shamir, GQ, Schnorr, ornon-interactive zero-knowledge proofs · CPC title

• H04L9/0866

  involving user or device identifiers, e.g. serial number, physical or biometrical information, DNA, hand-signature or measurable physical characteristics · CPC title

• H04L9/0825

  using asymmetric-key encryption or public key infrastructure [PKI], e.g. key signature or public key certificates · CPC title

• H04L9/085

  Secret sharing or secret splitting, e.g. threshold schemes · CPC title