System, method, and apparatus for obfuscating device operations
US-2018343119-A1 · Nov 29, 2018 · US
US11418334B2 · US · B2
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Publication number | US-11418334-B2 |
| Application number | US-201816756099-A |
| Country | US |
| Kind code | B2 |
| Filing date | Oct 8, 2018 |
| Priority date | Oct 18, 2017 |
| Publication date | Aug 16, 2022 |
| Grant date | Aug 16, 2022 |
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Systems and methods for performing modular inversion operations in a manner protected from external monitoring attacks. An example method comprises: determining, by a processor, a first masked value based on a public cryptographic key and a first random integer value; determining a second masked value based on the public cryptographic key and a second random integer value, and determining, based on the first masked value and the second masked value, a private cryptographic key represented by a modular inversion of the public cryptographic key.
Opening claim text (preview).
What is claimed is: 1. A method of performing a cryptographic data processing operation in a manner protected from external monitoring attacks, the method comprising: determining, by a cryptographic data processing device, a first masked value equal to a remainder of integer division of a product of a public cryptographic key and a first random integer value by a modulus value; determining a second masked value based on the public cryptographic key and a second random integer value; and determining, based on the first masked value and the second masked value, a private cryptographic key represented by a modular multiplicative inversion of the public cryptographic key. 2. The method of claim 1 , wherein the second masked value is represented by a sum of the modulus value and a remainder of integer division of a product of the public cryptographic key and the second random integer value by the modulus value. 3. The method of claim 1 , wherein the modulus value is represented by a value of Euler totient function of a product of two random prime numbers. 4. The method of claim 1 , wherein the public cryptographic key is represented by an integer value which is co-prime with the modulus value. 5. The method of claim 1 , wherein the first masked value is represented by a product of the public cryptographic key and the first random integer value. 6. The method of claim 5 , wherein the second masked value is represented by a sum of a modulus value and a product of the public cryptographic key and the second random integer value. 7. The method of claim 1 , wherein determining the private cryptographic key further comprises: computing a sum of a product of a first integer multiplier and the first random integer value and a product of a second integer multiplier and the second random integer value. 8. The method of claim 7 , wherein a sum of a product of the first integer multiplier and the first masked value and a product of the second integer multiplier and the second masked value equals to a pre-defined integer constant. 9. The method of claim 1 , further comprising: utilizing the public cryptographic key and the private cryptographic key for performing a cryptographic data processing operation. 10. The method of claim 1 , further comprising: utilizing the private cryptographic key for decrypting a cyphertext that has been encrypted with the public cryptographic key. 11. A computer-readable non-transitory storage medium comprising executable instructions for perform a cryptographic data processing operation in a manner protected from external monitoring attacks, wherein the executable instructions, when executed by a computing device, cause the computing device to: determining, by a cryptographic data processing device, a first masked value equal to a remainder of integer division of a product of a public cryptographic key and a first random integer value by a modulus value; determining a second masked value based on the public cryptographic key and a second random integer value; and determining, based on the first masked value and the second masked value, a private cryptographic key represented by a modular multiplicative inversion of the public cryptographic key. 12. The computer-readable non-transitory storage medium of claim 11 , wherein the second masked value is represented by a sum of the modulus value and a remainder of integer division of a product of the public cryptographic key and the second random integer value by the modulus value. 13. The computer-readable non-transitory storage medium of claim 12 , wherein the modulus value is represented by a value of Euler totient function of a product of two random prime numbers. 14. The computer-readable non-transitory storage medium of claim 12 , wherein the public cryptographic key is represented by an integer value which is co-prime with the modulus value. 15. The computer-readable non-transitory storage medium of claim 11 , wherein determining the private cryptographic key further comprises: computing a sum of a product of a first integer multiplier and the first random integer value and a product of a second integer multiplier and the second random integer value. 16. The computer-readable non-transitory storage medium of claim 15 , wherein a sum of a product of the first integer multiplier and the first masked value and a product of the second integer multiplier and the second masked value equals to a pre-defined integer constant. 17. The computer-readable non-transitory storage medium of claim 11 , further comprising: utilizing the public cryptographic key and the private cryptographic key for performing a cryptographic data processing operation.
for power analysis, e.g. differential power analysis [DPA] or simple power analysis [SPA] · CPC title
involving the integer factorization problem, e.g. RSA or quadratic sieve [QS] schemes · CPC title
Providing cryptographic facilities or services · CPC title
Details relating to cryptographic hardware or logic circuitry · CPC title
of operations, operands or results of the operations · CPC title
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