Security profiling of system firmware and applications from an OOB appliance at a differentiated trust boundary

Patent metadata

Field	Value
Publication number	US-11409884-B2
Application number	US-201816176096-A
Country	US
Kind code	B2
Filing date	Oct 31, 2018
Priority date	Oct 31, 2018
Publication date	Aug 9, 2022
Grant date	Aug 9, 2022

Abstract

A system, method, and computer-readable medium for a security vulnerability detection operation. The security vulnerability operation includes configuring a firmware security profiling environment with a trusted host and a trusted service processor; receiving a firmware update file via the trusted service processor; using the trusted service processor to identify a security vulnerability within the firmware update file; and, installing the firmware update file to the information handling system only when no security vulnerability is identified by the trusted service processor, the installing being performed by the trusted host.

First claim

What is claimed is:

1. A computer-implementable method for performing a security vulnerability detection operation, comprising:
configuring a firmware security profiling environment with a trusted host and a trusted service processor, the trusted host comprising a host system configured to provide a trust boundary for data the trusted host provides to an associated sub-system, the trusted service processor comprising an out of band management controller, the trusted service processor being configured to provide a trust boundary for data the trusted service processor provides an information handling system;
receiving a firmware update file via the out of band management controller of the trusted service processor, the firmware update file including an associated digital signature attesting to validity of the firmware update file, the out of band management controller of the trusted service processor providing a dedicated channel for providing the firmware update file to the information handling system;
using the trusted service processor to identify a security vulnerability within the firmware update file; and,
installing the firmware update file to the information handling system only when no security vulnerability is identified by the trusted service processor, the installing being performed by the trusted host.

2. The method of claim 1 , wherein:
the firmware update file is used to update a sub-system of the information handling system.

3. The method of claim 1 , wherein:
the firmware update file is received via an externally provided firmware update package.

4. The method of claim 1 , wherein:
the identifying the security vulnerabilities comprises using a malware scanning application file and the digital signature, the identifying determining whether the digital signature deceptively attests to validity of the firmware update file.

5. The method of claim 4 , wherein:
the malware scanning application file and the digital signature are provided by the trusted host.

6. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:
mapping the firmware update file to a memory-mapped device contained within the trusted service processor.

7. A system comprising:
a processor;
a data bus coupled to the processor; and
a non-transitory, computer-readable storage medium embodying computer program code, the non-transitory, computer-readable storage medium being coupled to the data bus, the computer program code interacting with a plurality of computer operations and comprising instructions executable by the processor and configured for:
configuring a firmware security profiling environment with a trusted host and a trusted service processor, the trusted host comprising a host system configured to provide a trust boundary for data the trusted host provides to an associated sub-system, the trusted service processor comprising an out of band management controller, the trusted service processor being configured to provide a trust boundary for data the trusted service processor provides an information handling system;
receiving a firmware update file via the out of band management controller of the trusted service processor, the firmware update file including an associated digital signature attesting to validity of the firmware update file, the out of band management controller of the trusted service processor providing a dedicated channel for providing the firmware update file to the information handling system;
using the trusted service processor to identify a security vulnerability within the firmware update file; and,
installing the firmware update file to the information handling system only when no security vulnerability is identified by the trusted service processor, the installing being performed by the trusted host.

8. The system of claim 7 , wherein:
the firmware update file is used to update a sub-system of the information handling system.

9. The system of claim 7 , wherein:
the firmware update file is received via an externally provided firmware update package.

10. The system of claim 7 , wherein the instructions executable by the processor are further configured for:
the identifying the security vulnerabilities comprises using a malware scanning application file and the digital signature, the identifying determining whether the digital signature deceptively attests to validity of the firmware update file.

11. The system of claim 10 , wherein:
the malware scanning application file and the digital signature are provided by the trusted host.

12. The system of claim 7 , wherein the instructions executable by the processor are further configured for:
mapping the firmware update file to a memory-mapped device contained within the trusted service processor.

13. A non-transitory, computer-readable storage medium embodying computer program code, the computer program code comprising computer executable instructions configured for:
configuring a firmware security profiling environment with a trusted host and a trusted service processor, the trusted host comprising a host system configured to provide a trust boundary for data the trusted host provides to an associated sub-system, the trusted service processor comprising an out of band management controller, the trusted service processor being configured to provide a trust boundary for data the trusted service processor provides an information handling system;
receiving a firmware update file via the out of band management controller of the trusted service processor, the firmware update file including an associated digital signature attesting to validity of the firmware update file, the out of band management controller of the trusted service processor providing a dedicated channel for providing the firmware update file to the information handling system;
using the trusted service processor to identify a security vulnerability within the firmware update file; and,
installing the firmware update file to the information handling system only when no security vulnerability is identified by the trusted service processor, the installing being performed by the trusted host.

14. The non-transitory, computer-readable storage medium of claim 13 , wherein:
the firmware update file is used to update a sub-system of the information handling system.

15. The non-transitory, computer-readable storage medium of claim 14 , wherein:
the firmware update file is received via an externally provided firmware update package.

16. The non-transitory, computer-readable storage medium of claim 13 , wherein:
the identifying the security vulnerabilities comprises using a malware scanning application file and the digital signature, the identifying determining whether the digital signature deceptively attests to validity of the firmware update file.

17. The non-transitory, computer-readable storage medium of claim 16 , wherein:
the malware scanning application file and the digital signature are provided by the trusted host.

18. The non-transitory, computer-readable storage medium of claim 13 , wherein the computer executable instructions are further configured for:
mapping the firmware update file to a memory-mapped device contained within the trusted service processor.

19. The non-transitory, computer-readable storage medium of claim 13 , wherein:
the computer executable instructions are deployable to a client system from a server system at a remote location.

20. The non-transitory, computer-readable storage medium of claim 13 , wherein:
the computer executable instructions ar

Assignees

• Dell Products Lp

Inventors

• Gupta Chitrak
• Bisa Rama Rao
• Jreij Elie A
• Basavarajaiah Sushma
• Sampathkumar Kala
• Roy Mainak

Classifications

• G06F21/577 Primary

  Assessing vulnerabilities and evaluating computer system security · CPC title

• G06F8/65

  Updates (security arrangements therefor G06F21/57) · CPC title

• G06F21/564

  by virus signature recognition · CPC title

• G06F2221/033

  Test or assess software · CPC title

• G06F21/572

  Secure firmware programming, e.g. of basic input output system [BIOS] · CPC title