Secure engine communication

Patent metadata

Field	Value
Publication number	US-11290301-B2
Application number	US-201916687874-A
Country	US
Kind code	B2
Filing date	Nov 19, 2019
Priority date	Dec 20, 2018
Publication date	Mar 29, 2022
Grant date	Mar 29, 2022

Abstract

A method of communication, within a processing system of a gas turbine engine, between a first electronic component and a second electronic component, comprising: generating by the first electronic component, a request, comprising a digital certificate, intern comprising a first host public key and a first client public key, signed with a first host private key, to initiate a trusted communication session with a second electronic component; encrypting at the first electronic component, at least a portion of the request with a first client private key; transmitting the request to the second electronic component; the first host private key and the first host public key defining a first asymmetric keypair and the first client private key and the first client public key defining a second asymmetric keypair.

First claim

What is claimed is:

1. In a processing system of a gas turbine engine, a method of communicating between a first electronic component and a second electronic component, the method comprising:
generating by the first electronic component, a request to initiate a trusted communication session with a second electronic component, the request comprising a digital certificate signed with a first host private key, the digital certificate comprising a first host public key and a first client public key, the first host public key indicating that the first electronic component is a predetermined component type which the second electronic component is configured to accept as valid for receipt of a predetermined type of data;
encrypting at the first electronic component, at least a portion of the request with a first client private key;
transmitting the request to the second electronic component;

wherein the first host private key and the first host public key define a first asymmetric keypair and the first client private key and the first client public key define a second asymmetric keypair.

2. The method of claim 1 , wherein the portion of the request encrypted with the first client private key comprises a hash of at least the first client public key.

3. The method of claim 2 , wherein the hash is of at least the first client public key and the digital certificate.

4. The method of claim 1 , wherein the trusted communication session is a symmetric key encrypted digital communication session.

5. The method of claim 1 further comprising:
establishing at the second electronic component, the trusted communication session with the first electronic component based on authenticating the first electronic component by:
determining that the digital certificate is valid;

determining that a latency associated with the first electronic component is less than a predetermined value.

6. The method of claim 5 further comprising:
generating at the second electronic component, a symmetric key for the trusted communication session;
encrypting at the second electronic component, the symmetric key with the client public key;
transmitting the encrypted symmetric key to the first electronic component.

7. The method of claim 6 further comprising controlling by the second electronic component, a fuel valve based on metrics reported by the first electronic component during the trusted communication session.

8. The method of claim 5 further comprising assigning at the second electronic component, a privilege level to the first electronic component based on the first host public key.

9. The method of claim 1 further comprising:
determining at the second electronic component, whether the digital certificate is authentic by decrypting data within the digital certificate with the first host public key;
assigning at the second electronic component, a privilege level to the first electronic component based on the digital certificate; and
rejecting at the second electronic component, data sent from the first electronic component based on the privilege level during the trusted communication session.

10. The method of claim 1 , wherein the first electronic component is a smart sensor comprising a transducer.

11. A processing system for controlling a gas turbine engine, the processing system comprising a first electronic component, the first electronic component being configured to:
generate a request to initiate a trusted communication session with a second electronic component, the request comprising a digital certificate signed with a first host private key, the digital certificate comprising a first host public key and a first client public key, the first host public key indicating that the first electronic component is a predetermined component type which the second electronic component is configured to accept as valid for receipt of a predetermined type of data;
encrypt at least a portion of the request with a first client private key;
transmit the request to the second electronic component;

wherein the first host private key and the first host public key define a first asymmetric keypair and the first client private key and the first client public key define a second asymmetric keypair.

12. The processing system of claim 11 , wherein the portion of the request encrypted with the first client private key comprises a hash of at least the first client public key.

13. The processing system of claim 12 , wherein the hash is of at least the first client public key and the digital certificate.

14. The processing system of claim 11 , wherein the trusted communication session is a symmetric key encrypted digital communication session.

15. The processing system of claim 11 further comprising a second electronic component, which is configured to:
begin the trusted communication session with the first electronic component based on an authentication of the first electronic component by:
determining that the digital certificate is valid;
determining that a latency associated with the first electronic component is less than a predetermined value.

16. The processing system of claim 15 , wherein the second electronic component is further configured to:
generate a symmetric key for the trusted communication session;
encrypt the symmetric key with the first client public key;
transmit the encrypted symmetric key to the first electronic component.

17. The processing system of claim 16 , wherein the second electronic component is further configured to control a fuel valve based on metrics reported by the first electronic component during the trusted communication session.

18. The processing system of claim 15 , wherein the second electronic component is further configured to assign a privilege level to the first electronic component based on the first host public key.

19. The processing system of claim 11 further comprising a second electronic component, which is configured to:
determine whether the digital certificate is authentic by decrypting data within the digital certificate with the first host public key;
assign a privilege level to the first electronic component based on the digital certificate; and
during the trusted communication session, reject data sent from the first electronic component based on the privilege level.

20. A method of authenticating data originating from a component supplied by a vendor and received by an engine control module in a gas turbine engine, comprising:
generating operational data in the component, the data indicative of a characteristic associated with the operation of the gas turbine;
encrypting the operational data and a hash with a private key associated with the vendor to create an encrypted message;
transmitting the encrypted message to the engine control module;
receiving the encrypted message at the engine control module;
decrypting the encrypted message, at the engine control module, with a public key associated with the vendor to obtain a decrypted hash, the public key included in a digital certificate received by the engine control module from the component, the public key indicating the component is a predetermined component type from which the engine control module trusts to receive a predetermined type of data;
ensuring the decrypted hash matches a stored hash in the engine control module to thereby authenticate the operational data;
wherein the public key and private key are an asymmetric key pair and the component is a sensor or actuator located on the gas turbi

Assignees

• Rolls Royce Nam Tech Inc
• Rolls Royce Corp

Inventors

• Skertic Richard J
• Costello John J
• Duge Robert T

Classifications

• H04L12/437 Primary

  Ring fault isolation or reconfiguration {(for SDH/SONET ring networks H04J3/085)} · CPC title

• H04L63/12 Primary

  Applying verification of the received information (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for data integrity or data verification H04L9/32) · CPC title

• H04L9/38

  Encryption being effected by mechanical apparatus, e.g. rotating cams, switches, keytape punchers · CPC title

• H04L9/34

  Bits, or blocks of bits, of the telegraphic message being interchanged in time {(for speech signals H04K1/06)} · CPC title

• H04L9/32

  including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system {or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials} · CPC title