Authentication using a secure circuit
US-2017357967-A1 · Dec 14, 2017 · US
US11258591B2 · US · B2
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Publication number | US-11258591-B2 |
| Application number | US-202117348413-A |
| Country | US |
| Kind code | B2 |
| Filing date | Jun 15, 2021 |
| Priority date | Mar 29, 2019 |
| Publication date | Feb 22, 2022 |
| Grant date | Feb 22, 2022 |
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Disclosed herein are methods, systems, and apparatus, including computer programs encoded on computer storage media, for managing cryptographic keys based on user identity information. One of the methods includes receiving a request to store identity information and a user key pair to a memory on a chip, the request being digitally signed with a digital signature, the identity information uniquely identifying the user, and the user key pair being assigned to the user; determining that the digital signature is authentic based on a public key pre-stored in the memory; encrypting the identity information and the user key pair; and storing the identity information and the user key pair to the memory.
Opening claim text (preview).
What is claimed is: 1. A computer-implemented method comprising receiving, by an identity cryptographic chip (ICC), a request to input a public authorization key; in response to receiving the request to input the public authorization key, resetting, by the ICC, the ICC; after resetting the ICC, receiving, by the ICC, the public authorization key; in response to receiving the public authorization key, determining, by the ICC, memory of the ICC is not a type of one-time programmable (OTP) memory; in response to determining the memory of the ICC is not the type of OTP memory, erasing, by the ICC, the memory of the ICC; encrypting, by the ICC, the public authorization key as an encrypted public authorization key; and inputting, by the ICC, the encrypted public authorization key to the memory of the ICC. 2. The computer-implemented method of claim 1 , wherein resetting the ICC comprises: reconfiguring settings of a logic computing component of the ICC to default. 3. The computer-implemented method of claim 1 , wherein resetting the ICC comprises: erasing identity information and cryptographic key pairs previously stored in the ICC. 4. The computer-implemented method of claim 1 , comprising: pre-storing the public authorization key and a private authorization key, wherein the public authorization key and the private authorization key are an asymmetric-key pair assigned to a master user of the ICC. 5. The computer-implemented method of claim 1 , comprising: storing identity authentication code executable to authenticate a user based on identity information. 6. The computer-implemented method of claim 1 , comprising: storing first cryptographic operation code executable to add a digital signature corresponding to a second request based on a private authorization key corresponding to the public authorization key; and storing second cryptographic operation code executable to perform file encryption or file decryption based on a user key pair assigned to a user. 7. The computer-implemented method of claim 1 , comprising: receiving a second request to store, to the memory on the ICC, identity information and a user key pair, wherein the request is digitally signed with a digital signature, wherein the identity information uniquely identifies a user, and wherein the user key pair is assigned to the user; determining that the digital signature is authentic based on the public authorization key; encrypting the identity information and the user key pair; and storing the identity information and the user key pair to the memory. 8. The computer-implemented method of claim 7 , wherein the identity information is biometric information. 9. The computer-implemented method of claim 1 , wherein the memory is a programmable read-only memory (PROM), an electrically erasable PROM or a flash memory. 10. A non-transitory, computer-readable storage medium storing one or more instructions executable by a computer system to perform operations comprising: receiving, by an identity cryptographic chip (ICC), a request to input a public authorization key; in response to receiving the request to input the public authorization key, resetting, by the ICC, the ICC; after resetting the ICC, receiving, by the ICC, the public authorization key; in response to receiving the public authorization key, determining, by the ICC, memory of the ICC is not a type of one-time programmable (OTP) memory; in response to determining the memory of the ICC is not the type of OTP memory, erasing, by the ICC, the memory of the ICC; encrypting, by the ICC, the public authorization key as an encrypted public authorization key; and inputting, by the ICC, the encrypted public authorization key to the memory of the ICC. 11. The non-transitory, computer-readable storage medium of claim 10 , wherein resetting the ICC comprises: reconfiguring settings of a logic computing component of the ICC to default. 12. The non-transitory, computer-readable storage medium of claim 10 , wherein resetting the ICC comprises: erasing identity information and cryptographic key pairs previously stored in the ICC. 13. The non-transitory, computer-readable storage medium of claim 10 , comprising: pre-storing the public authorization key and a private authorization key, wherein the public authorization key and the private authorization key are an asymmetric-key pair assigned to a master user of the ICC. 14. The non-transitory, computer-readable storage medium of claim 10 , comprising: storing identity authentication code executable to authenticate a user based on identity information. 15. The non-transitory, computer-readable storage medium of claim 10 , comprising: storing first cryptographic operation code executable to add a digital signature corresponding to a second request based on a private authorization key corresponding to the public authorization key; and storing second cryptographic operation code executable to perform file encryption or file decryption based on a user key pair assigned to a user. 16. The non-transitory, computer-readable storage medium of claim 10 , comprising: receiving a second request to store, to the memory on the ICC, identity information and a user key pair, wherein the request is digitally signed with a digital signature, wherein the identity information uniquely identifies a user, and wherein the user key pair is assigned to the user; determining that the digital signature is authentic based on the public authorization key; encrypting the identity information and the user key pair; and storing the identity information and the user key pair to the memory. 17. The non-transitory, computer-readable storage medium of claim 16 , wherein the identity information is biometric information. 18. The non-transitory, computer-readable storage medium of claim 10 , wherein the memory is a programmable read-only memory (PROM), an electrically erasable PROM or a flash memory. 19. A computer-implemented system, comprising: one or more computing devices; and one or more computer memory devices interoperably coupled with the one or more computing devices and having tangible, non-transitory, machine-readable media storing one or more instructions that, when executed by the one or more computing devices, perform one or more operations comprising: receiving, by an identity cryptographic chip (ICC), a request to input a public authorization key; in response to receiving the request to input the public authorization key, resetting, by the ICC, the ICC; after resetting the ICC, receiving, by the ICC, the public authorization key; in response to receiving the public authorization key, determining, by the ICC, memory of the ICC is not a type of one-time programmable (OTP) memory; in response to determining the memory of the ICC is not the type of OTP memory, erasing, by the ICC, the memory of the ICC; encrypting, by the ICC, the public authorization key as an encrypted public authorization key; and inputting, by the ICC, the encrypted public authorization key to the memory of the ICC. 20. The computer-implemented system of claim 19 , wherein resetting the ICC comprises: reconfiguring settings of a logic computing component of the ICC to default.
involving digital signatures · CPC title
involving non-keyed hash functions, e.g. modification detection codes [MDCs], MD5, SHA or RIPEMD · CPC title
using tickets or tokens, e.g. Kerberos (network architectures or network communication protocols for entities authentication using tickets in a packet data network H04L63/0807) · CPC title
involving additional devices, e.g. trusted platform module [TPM], smartcard or USB · CPC title
Revocation or update of secret information, e.g. encryption key update or rekeying · CPC title
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