Trojan detection in cryptographic hardware adapters

Patent metadata

Field	Value
Publication number	US-11232209-B2
Application number	US-201916251657-A
Country	US
Kind code	B2
Filing date	Jan 18, 2019
Priority date	Jan 18, 2019
Publication date	Jan 25, 2022
Grant date	Jan 25, 2022

Abstract

A cryptographic hardware security module (HSM) includes a memory storage device and an immutable hardware unit in signal communication with the memory storage device. The memory storage device is configured to store firmware. The immutable hardware unit is configured to perform a hash operation on targeted firmware stored in the memory storage device to determine an authenticity of the targeted firmware based at least in part on results of the hash operation.

First claim

What is claimed is:

1. A cryptographic hardware security module (HSM) comprising:
a memory storage device configured to store firmware; and
an immutable hardware unit in signal communication with the memory storage device, the immutable hardware unit configured to perform a hash operation on targeted firmware stored in the memory storage device to determine an authenticity of the targeted firmware based at least in part on results of the hash operation; and
a secured boundary that contains the memory storage device and the immutable hardware unit,
wherein the immutable hardware unit comprises:
a hash engine in signal communication with the memory storage device, the hash engine configured to receive the targeted firmware and to perform the hash operation on the targeted firmware to generate hash results, and
wherein the hash results are configured to be delivered to an external processor located externally from the HSM such that the external processor determines the authenticity of the targeted firmware in response to comparing the hash results to a predetermined hash corresponding to an authenticated firmware.

2. The cryptographic HSM of claim 1 , wherein the hash operation is performed without physically accessing the secured boundary.

3. The cryptographic HSM of claim 1 , wherein the hash engine receives the targeted firmware in response to booting the cryptographic HSM, and performs the hashing operation to generate the hash results in response to receiving the targeted firmware.

4. The cryptographic HSM of claim 1 , wherein logic circuitry within the immutable hardware unit disables the targeted firmware from the memory storage device in response to detecting the results of the hash operation fail to match the predetermined hash.

5. A method of authenticating firmware stored in a cryptographic hardware security module (HSM), the method comprising:
securing a memory storage device and an immutable hardware unit within a secured boundary that prevents external access to the memory storage device and the immutable hardware unit;
initiating an authentication process;
delivering targeted firmware from the storage memory device to the immutable hardware unit;
performing, by the immutable hardware unit, a hash operation on the targeted firmware; and
determining an authenticity of the targeted firmware based at least in part on results of the hash operation,
wherein determining the authenticity of the targeted firmware further comprises:
delivering the targeted firmware to a hash engine within the immutable hardware unit;
performing, by the hash engine, the hash operation on the targeted firmware to generate hash results,
delivering the hash results to an external processor located externally from the HSM;
comparing, by the external processor, the hash results to a predetermined hash corresponding to an authenticated firmware; and
determining, by the external processor, the authenticity of the targeted firmware based on the comparison between the hash results and the predetermined hash.

6. The method of claim 5 , further comprising performing the hash operation without physically accessing the secured boundary.

7. The method of claim 5 , wherein determining the authenticity of the targeted firmware further comprises:
delivering the targeted firmware to the hash engine in response to booting the cryptographic HSM; and
performing the hashing operation to generate the hash results in response to receiving the targeted firmware.

8. The method of claim 5 , further comprising erasing the targeted firmware from the memory storage device in response to detecting the results of the hash operation fail to match the predetermined hash.

9. A computer program product to control a cryptographic hardware security module (HSM) to authenticate firmware, the computer program product comprising a computer readable storage medium having program instructions embodied therewith, the program instructions executable by an electronic computer processor to control the cryptographic HSM to perform operations comprising:
initiating an authentication process;
delivering targeted firmware from a storage memory device to an immutable hardware unit, wherein the memory storage device and the immutable hardware unit are each secured within a secured boundary that prevents external access to the memory storage device and the immutable hardware unit;
performing, by the immutable hardware unit, a hash operation on the targeted firmware; and
determining an authenticity of the targeted firmware based at least in part on results of the hash operation,
wherein determining the authenticity of the targeted firmware further comprises:
delivering the targeted firmware to a hash engine within the immutable hardware unit;
performing, the hash engine, the hash operation on the targeted firmware to generate hash results,

delivering the hash results to an external processor located externally from the HSM;
comparing, by the external processor, the hash results to a predetermined hash corresponding to an authenticated firmware; and
determining, by the external processor, the authenticity of the targeted firmware based on the comparison between the hash results and the predetermined hash.

10. The computer program product of claim 9 , further comprising performing the hash operation without physically accessing the secured boundary.

11. The computer program product of claim 9 , wherein determining the authenticity of the targeted firmware further comprises:
delivering the targeted firmware to the hash engine in response to booting the cryptographic HSM; and
performing the hashing operation to generate the hash results in response to receiving the targeted firmware.

12. The computer program product of claim 9 , further comprising erasing the targeted firmware from the memory storage device in response to detecting the results of the hash operation fail to match the predetermined hash.

Assignees

• IBM

Inventors

• Hocker Michael D

Classifications

• G06F21/51 Primary

  at application loading time, e.g. accepting, rejecting, starting or inhibiting executable software based on integrity or source reliability · CPC title

• H04L9/0897

  involving additional devices, e.g. trusted platform module [TPM], smartcard or USB · CPC title

• H04L9/3236

  using cryptographic hash functions · CPC title

• G06F21/30

  Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals · CPC title

• G06F21/72

  in cryptographic circuits · CPC title