Systems And Methods With Auxiliary Control Boards Having Interface Devices
US-2024393848-A1 · Nov 28, 2024 · US
US11080222B2 · US · B2
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Publication number | US-11080222-B2 |
| Application number | US-201815862030-A |
| Country | US |
| Kind code | B2 |
| Filing date | Jan 4, 2018 |
| Priority date | Mar 24, 2016 |
| Publication date | Aug 3, 2021 |
| Grant date | Aug 3, 2021 |
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An optical electromagnetic radiation (EM) emitter and receiver are located upon a printed circuit board (PCB) glass security layer. A predetermined reference flux or interference pattern, respectively, is an expected flux or reflection pattern of EM emitted from the EM emitter, transmitted by the glass security layer, and received by the EM receiver. When the PCB is subject to an unauthorized access thereof the optical EM transmitted by glass security layer is altered. An optical monitoring device that monitors the flux or interference pattern of the optical EM received by the EM receiver detects a change in flux or interference pattern, in relation to the reference flux or reference interference pattern, respectively, and passes a tamper signal to one or more computer system devices to respond to the unauthorized access. For example, one or more cryptographic adapter card or computer system functions or secured crypto components may be disabled.
Opening claim text (preview).
What is claimed is: 1. A data handling electronic device comprising: a motherboard comprising a processor and a memory; and a cryptographic adapter card, the cryptographic adapter card comprising: a printed circuit board (PCB) comprising a connector that interconnects with the motherboard; a secure crypto module comprising a daughter card electrically connected to the PCB; the a daughter card comprising: a glass security layer, an optical electromagnetic radiation (EM) emitter upon the glass security layer, an optical EM receiver upon the glass security layer, and a crypto component; wherein a destruct feature of the crypto component is programmed in response to the optical EM receiver receiving a predetermined threshold decrease of optical flux of optical EM transmitted from the optical EM emitter to the optical EM receiver by the glass security layer. 2. The data handling electronic device of claim 1 , wherein the daughter card further comprises an optical monitor device that generates a tamper signal in response to the optical EM receiver receiving the predetermined threshold decrease in optical flux transmitted from the optical EM emitter to the optical EM receiver by the glass security layer. 3. The data handling electronic device of claim 2 , wherein the daughter card further comprises an enable device that upon receipt of the tamper signal from the monitor device programs the destruct feature. 4. The data handling electronic device of claim 1 , wherein the daughter card further comprises an optically opaque encapsulation layer upon the glass security layer. 5. The data handling electronic device of claim 1 , wherein glass security layer is a layer of toughened glass. 6. The data handling electronic device of claim 1 , wherein the glass security layer is a perimeter layer of the daughter card that encapsulates the crypto component. 7. The data handling electronic device of claim 1 , wherein a majority of the surface area of the glass security layer shatters as a result of an unauthorized physical access thereto. 8. The data handling electronic device of claim 1 , wherein optical EM is transmitted by the glass security layer by total internal reflection. 9. A data handling electronic device comprising: a motherboard comprising a processor and a memory; and a cryptographic adapter card, the cryptographic adapter card comprising: a printed circuit board (PCB) comprising a connector that interconnects with the motherboard; a secure crypto module comprising a daughter card electrically connected to the PCB; the a daughter card comprising: a glass security layer, an optical electromagnetic radiation (EM) emitter upon the glass security layer, an optical EM receiver upon the glass security layer, and a crypto component; wherein a destruct feature of the crypto component is programmed when the optical EM receiver detects that an interference pattern of optical EM emitted from the optical EM emitter and transmitted by the glass security layer is different from a predetermined expected optical EM interference pattern. 10. The data handling electronic device of claim 9 , wherein the daughter card further comprises an optical monitor device that generates a tamper signal in response to the optical EM receiver detecting the interference pattern of optical EM emitted from the optical EM emitter and transmitted by the glass security layer is different from the predetermined expected optical EM interference pattern. 11. The data handling electronic device of claim 10 , wherein the daughter card further comprises an enable device that upon receipt of the tamper signal from the monitor device programs the destruct feature. 12. The data handling electronic device of claim 9 , wherein the daughter card further comprises an optically opaque encapsulation layer upon the glass security layer. 13. The data handling electronic device of claim 9 , wherein glass security layer is a layer of toughened glass. 14. The data handling electronic device of claim 9 , wherein the glass security layer is a perimeter layer of the daughter card that encapsulates the crypto component. 15. The data handling electronic device of claim 9 , wherein a majority of the surface area of the glass security layer shatters as a result of an unauthorized physical access thereto. 16. The data handling electronic device of claim 9 , wherein optical EM is transmitted by the glass security layer by total internal reflection.
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