Security key change method, base station, and user equipment

Patent metadata

Field	Value
Publication number	US-10855461-B2
Application number	US-201615221442-A
Country	US
Kind code	B2
Filing date	Jul 27, 2016
Priority date	Jan 28, 2014
Publication date	Dec 1, 2020
Grant date	Dec 1, 2020

Abstract

The present invention provides a security key change method and a user equipment (UE). The method performed by the UE includes: receiving a key change command message from a master eNodeB (MeNB), wherein the key change command message comprises an indication that a change of a security key between the UE and a secondary eNodeB (SeNB), and the UE is configured with a dual connectivity between the MeNB and the SeNB; updating a security key between the UE and the SeNB; performing random access to the SeNB; and sending a key change complete message to the MeNB.

First claim

What is claimed is:

1. A method comprising:
receiving, by a user equipment (UE), a message from a master eNodeB (MeNB), wherein the message comprises an indication of a change of a security key between the UE and the MeNB, and wherein the UE is configured with a dual connectivity between the MeNB and a secondary eNodeB (SeNB);
updating, by the UE according to the indication, the security key between the UE and the MeNB;
in a case of updating the security key between the UE and the MeNB in a Key Re-key manner, performing, by the UE, random access to both the MeNB and the SeNB, wherein the random access to the MeNB and the SeNB are performed concurrently;
in a case of updating the security key between the UE and the MeNB in a Key Refresh manner, keeping, by the UE, an active state of an activated secondary cell (SCell) of the SeNB, keeping data transmission between the UE and the SCell, and not performing random access to the SeNB; and
sending, by the UE, a key change complete message to the MeNB.

2. The method according to claim 1 , further comprising:
reporting, by the UE to the MeNB, that a current PDCP count on the SeNB side wraps around within preset times; and
updating, according to the indication, the security key between the UE and the SeNB.

3. The method according to claim 1 , wherein updating the security key between the UE and the MeNB in the Key Re-key manner comprises:
updating, by the UE, a UE-side intermediate key between the UE and the MeNB according to an updated access security management entity (ASME) intermediate key; and
generating, by the UE according to a security algorithm of the MeNB and the UE-side intermediate key corresponding to the MeNB, a new security key corresponding to the MeNB, wherein the new security key corresponding to the MeNB comprises: a cipher key and an integrity protection key for communication between the UE and the MeNB.

4. An apparatus, comprising:
a receiver, configured to receive a message from a master eNodeB (MeNB), wherein the message comprises an indication of a change of a security key between a user equipment (UE) and the MeNB, wherein the UE is the apparatus or the apparatus is applicable to the UE, and wherein the UE is configured with a dual connectivity between the MeNB and a secondary eNodeB (SeNB);
a processor;
a non-transitory computer readable storage medium storing a program for execution by the processor, the program including instructions to:
update, according to the indication, a security key between the UE and the MeNB; and
in a case of updating the security key between the UE and the MeNB in a Key Re-key manner, perform random access to both the MeNB and the SeNB, wherein the random access to the MeNB and the SeNB are performed concurrently;
in a case of updating the security key between the UE and the MeNB in a Key Refresh manner, keep an active state of an activated secondary cell (SCell) of the SeNB, keep data transmission between the UE and the SCell, and not perform random access to the SeNB; and
a transmitter, configured to send a key change complete message to the MeNB.

5. The apparatus according to claim 4 , wherein:
the transmitter is further configured to report that a current PDCP count on the SeNB side wraps around within preset times to the MeNB; and
the program includes further instructions to:
update, according to the indication, the security key between the UE and the SeNB.

6. The apparatus according to claim 4 , wherein updating the security key between the UE and the MeNB in the Key Re-key manner comprises:
updating a UE-side intermediate key between the UE and the MeNB according to an updated access security management entity (ASME) intermediate key; and
generating according to a security algorithm of the MeNB and the UE-side intermediate key corresponding to the MeNB, a new security key corresponding to the MeNB, wherein the new security key corresponding to the MeNB comprises: a cipher key and an integrity protection key for communication between the UE and the MeNB.

7. A non-transitory computer readable medium storing a program for execution by a processor, the program including instructions for:
receiving a message from a master eNodeB (MeNB), wherein the message comprises an indication of a change of a security key between a user equipment (UE) which the processor is used for and the MeNB, wherein the UE is configured to have a dual connectivity with the MeNB and a secondary eNodeB (SeNB);
updating, according to the indication, the security key between the UE and the MeNB; and
in a case of updating the security key between the UE and the MeNB in a Key Re-key manner, performing random access to both the MeNB and the SeNB, wherein the random access to the MeNB and the SeNB are performed concurrently;
in a case of updating the security key between the UE and the MeNB in a Key Refresh manner, keeping an active state of an activated secondary cell (SCell) of the SeNB, keeping data transmission between the UE and the SCell, and not performing random access to the SeNB; and
sending a key change complete message to the MeNB.

8. The non-transitory computer readable medium according to claim 7 , the program including further instructions for:
reporting, to the MeNB, that a current PDCP count on the SeNB side wraps around within preset times; and
updating, according to the indication, the security key between the UE and the SeNB.

9. The non-transitory computer readable medium according to claim 7 , wherein the instructions for updating the security key between the UE and the MeNB in the Key Re-key manner comprises:
updating a UE-side intermediate key between the UE and the MeNB according to an updated access security management entity (ASME) intermediate key; and
generating according to a security algorithm of the MeNB and the UE-side intermediate key corresponding to the MeNB, a new security key corresponding to the MeNB, wherein the new security key corresponding to the MeNB comprises: a cipher key and an integrity protection key for communication between the UE and the MeNB.

Assignees

• Huawei Tech Co Ltd

Inventors

• Chang Junren
• Bi Hao
• Guo Yi
• Zhang Dongmei
• Lin Bo

Classifications

• H04W36/0069

  in case of dual connectivity, e.g. decoupled uplink/downlink · CPC title

• H04W12/0433

  Key management protocols · CPC title

• H04W12/0431

  Key distribution or pre-distribution; Key agreement · CPC title

• H04W12/041

  Key generation or derivation · CPC title

• H04W88/08

  Access point devices · CPC title