Toggling biometric authentication
US-9305155-B1 · Apr 5, 2016 · US
US10770076B2 · US · B2
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Publication number | US-10770076-B2 |
| Application number | US-201816020406-A |
| Country | US |
| Kind code | B2 |
| Filing date | Jun 27, 2018 |
| Priority date | Jun 28, 2017 |
| Publication date | Sep 8, 2020 |
| Grant date | Sep 8, 2020 |
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A method of detecting a replay attack on a voice biometrics system comprises: receiving an audio signal representing speech; detecting a magnetic field; determining if there is a correlation between the audio signal and the magnetic field; and if there is a correlation between the audio signal and the magnetic field, determining that the audio signal may result from a replay attack.
Opening claim text (preview).
The invention claimed is: 1. A method of detecting a replay attack on a voice biometrics system, the method comprising: receiving an audio signal representing speech; detecting a magnetic field; determining if there is a correlation between the audio signal and the magnetic field, wherein determining if there is a correlation between the audio signal and the magnetic field comprises: sampling the detected magnetic field at a first sample rate; sampling the audio signal at a second sample rate; and determining if there is a correlation between the sampled audio signal and the sampled detected magnetic field; and if there is a correlation between the audio signal and the magnetic field, determining that the audio signal may result from a replay attack. 2. A method according to claim 1 , wherein determining if there is a correlation between the audio signal and the magnetic field comprises: identifying first periods during which the audio signal contains speech; identifying second periods during which the magnetic field differs from a baseline; and determining if the first and second periods are substantially the same. 3. A method according to claim 2 , comprising determining that the first and second periods are substantially the same if more than 60% of the first periods during which the audio signal contains speech overlap with the second periods during which the magnetic field differs significantly from a baseline, and/or more than 60% of the second periods during which the magnetic field differs significantly from a baseline overlap with first periods during which the audio signal contains speech. 4. A method according to claim 3 , comprising determining that the first and second periods are substantially the same if more than 80% of the first periods during which the audio signal contains speech overlap with second periods during which the magnetic field differs significantly from a baseline, and/or more than 80% of the second periods during which the magnetic field differs significantly from a baseline overlap with first periods during which the audio signal contains speech. 5. A method according to claim 1 , comprising: receiving a series of values of a signal representing a magnetic field strength; forming an average value of the magnetic field strength over a period of time; and subtracting the average value of the magnetic field strength from the series of values of the signal representing the magnetic field strength to form said detected magnetic field. 6. A method according to claim 1 , comprising: obtaining a digital audio signal at a third sample rate, and undersampling said digital audio signal to form said audio signal at said second sample rate. 7. A method according to claim 1 , wherein said second sample rate is approximately equal to said sample rate. 8. A method according to claim 1 , wherein the step of determining if there is a correlation between the sampled audio signal and the sampled detected magnetic field comprises performing a mathematical correlation operation on the sampled audio signal and the sampled detected magnetic field to obtain an output correlation function, and determining if a peak value of the output correlation function exceeds a predetermined threshold. 9. A method according to claim 1 , further comprising: determining a direction of a source of said audio signal representing speech; determining a direction of a source of said magnetic field; and determining that the audio signal may result from a replay attack if the direction of the source of said audio signal representing speech corresponds to the direction of the source of said magnetic field. 10. A system for detecting a replay attack on a voice biometrics system, the system comprising: an input for receiving an audio signal representing speech; a detector for detecting a magnetic field; and a processor for: determining if there is a correlation between the audio signal and the magnetic field, wherein determining if there is a correlation between the audio signal and the magnetic field comprises: sampling the detected magnetic field at a first sample rate; sampling the audio signal at a second sample rate; and determining if there is a correlation between the sampled audio signal and the sampled detected magnetic field; and if there is a correlation between the audio signal and the magnetic field, determining that the audio signal may result from a replay attack. 11. A computer program product, comprising a non-transitory computer-readable tangible medium, and instructions for performing a method according to claim 1 .
characterized in that the jamming signal is produced by retransmitting a received signal, after delay or processing · CPC title
using deceptive jamming or spoofing, e.g. transmission of false signals for premature triggering of RCIED, for forced connection or disconnection to/from a network or for generation of dummy target signal · CPC title
including jamming detection and monitoring · CPC title
Secret communication · CPC title
Protecting privacy or anonymity, e.g. protecting personally identifiable information [PII] · CPC title
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