Secure crypto module including conductor on glass security layer

Patent metadata

Field	Value
Publication number	US-10715337-B2
Application number	US-201715810464-A
Country	US
Kind code	B2
Filing date	Nov 13, 2017
Priority date	Feb 3, 2016
Publication date	Jul 14, 2020
Grant date	Jul 14, 2020

Abstract

A conductor on glass security layer may be located within a printed circuit board (PCB) of a crypto adapter card or within a daughter card upon the crypto adapter card. The conductor on glass security layer includes a glass dielectric layer that remains intact in the absence of point force loading and shatters when a point load punctures or otherwise contacts the glass dielectric layer. The conductor on glass security layer also includes a conductive security trace upon the glass dielectric layer. A physical access attempt shatters a majority of the glass dielectric layer, which in turn fractures the security trace. A monitoring circuit that monitors the resistance of the conductive security trace detects the resultant open circuit or change in security trace resistance and initiates a tamper signal that which may be received by one or more computer system devices to respond to the unauthorized attempt of physical access.

First claim

What is claimed is:

1. An adapter card comprising:
a printed circuit board (PCB) comprising a connector that interconnects with a motherboard, the PCB comprising a PCB conductor on glass security layer comprising a first security trace directly upon a first toughened glass substrate;
a secure crypto module comprising a daughter card electrically connected to the PCB, a shield comprising a metal shell that surrounds the daughter card, and a shield conductor on glass security layer directly upon an inner surface of the metal shell that faces the daughter card, the shield conductor on glass security layer comprising a second security trace directly upon a second toughened glass substrate;
the daughter card comprising: one or more wiring layers each comprising a signal trace directly upon a dielectric layer, a crypto component, and a daughter card conductor on glass security layer comprising a third security trace directly upon a third toughened glass substrate; and
a resistance monitor device, imbedded within the PCB, electrically connected to the first security trace, the second security trace, and the third security trace, wherein a destruct feature of the crypto component is programmed in response to the resistance monitor device detecting the resistance across the first security trace, the second security trace, or the third security trace exceeds a respective predetermined threshold.

2. The adapter card of claim 1 , wherein the first toughened glass substrate, the second toughened glass substrate, and the third toughened glass substrate each respectively comprise an inner portion that is in tension and is in between outer surfaces that are in compression.

3. The adapter card of claim 1 , wherein the daughter card conductor on glass security layer is an outer layer of the daughter card and is attached directly to the one or more wiring layers.

4. The adapter card of claim 1 , wherein the daughter card conductor on glass security layer is an inner layer of the daughter card and is attached directly to the one or more wiring layers.

5. The adapter card of claim 1 , wherein the daughter card further comprises an enable device that upon receipt of a tamper signal from the monitor device programs the destruct feature.

6. The adapter card of claim 1 , wherein the detected resistance across the first security trace, the second security trace, or the third security trace is an infinite resistance.

7. The adapter card of claim 1 , wherein the first security trace, the second security traces, or the third security trace is fractured as a result of an unauthorized physical access of the first toughened glass substrate, the second toughened glass substrate, or the third toughened glass substrate, respectively.

8. The adapter card of claim 1 , wherein the first security trace, the second security trace, or the third security trace is severed as a result of an unauthorized physical access of the first toughened glass substrate, the one or more second toughened glass substrates, or the third toughened glass substrate, respectively.

9. A data handling electronic device comprising:
a motherboard comprising a processor and a memory;
a printed circuit board (PCB) comprising a connector that interconnects with the motherboard, the PCB comprising a PCB conductor on glass security layer comprising a first security trace directly upon a first toughened glass substrate;
a secure crypto module comprising a daughter card electrically connected to the PCB, a shield comprising a metal shell that surrounds the daughter card, and a shield conductor on glass security layer directly upon an inner surface of the metal shell that faces the daughter card, the shield conductor on glass security layer comprising a second security trace directly upon a second toughened glass substrate;
the daughter card comprising: one or more wiring layers each comprising a signal trace directly upon a dielectric layer, a crypto component, and a daughter card conductor on glass security layer comprising a third security trace directly upon a third toughened glass substrate; and
a resistance monitor device, imbedded within the PCB, electrically connected to the first security trace, the second security trace, and the third security trace, wherein a destruct feature of the crypto component is programmed in response to the resistance monitor device detecting the resistance across the first security trace, the second security trace, or the third security trace exceeds a respective predetermined threshold.

10. The data handling electronic device of claim 9 , wherein the first toughened glass substrate, the second toughened glass substrate, and the third toughened glass substrate each respectively comprise an inner portion that is in tension and is in between outer surfaces that are in compression.

11. The data handling electronic device of claim 9 , wherein the daughter card conductor on glass security layer is an outer layer of the daughter card and is attached directly to the one or more wiring layers.

12. The data handling electronic device of claim 9 , wherein the daughter card conductor on glass security layer is an inner layer of the daughter card and is attached directly to the one or more wiring layers.

13. The data handling electronic device of claim 9 , wherein the daughter card further comprises an enable device that upon receipt of a tamper signal from the monitor device programs the destruct feature.

14. The data handling electronic device of claim 9 , wherein the detected resistance across the first security trace, the second security trace, and the third security trace is an infinite resistance.

15. The data handling electronic device of claim 9 , wherein the first security trace, the second security trace, or the third security trace is fractured as a result of an unauthorized physical access of the first toughened glass substrate, the one or more second toughened glass substrates, or the third toughened glass substrate, respectively.

16. The data handling electronic device of claim 9 , wherein the first security trace, the second security trace, or the third security trace is severed as a result of an unauthorized physical access of the first toughened glass substrate, the one or more second toughened glass substrates, or the third toughened glass substrate, respectively.

Assignees

• IBM

Inventors

• Bartley Gerald K
• Becker Darryl J
• Doyle Matthew S
• Jeanson Mark J
• Maxson Mark O

Classifications

• G06F13/4282 Primary

  on a serial bus, e.g. I2C bus, SPI bus (on daisy chain buses G06F13/4247) · CPC title

• H04L9/3263 Primary

  involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements (network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using certificates in a packet data network H04L63/0823) · CPC title

• H04L9/3234

  involving additional secure or trusted devices, e.g. TPM, smartcard, USB or software token (network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using an additional device in a packet data network H04L63/0853) · CPC title

• G06F13/409

  Mechanical coupling (back panels H05K7/1438) · CPC title

• G09C1/00

  Apparatus or methods whereby a given sequence of signs, e.g. an intelligible text, is transformed into an unintelligible sequence of signs by transposing the signs or groups of signs or by replacing them by others according to a predetermined system (cryptographic typewriters G09C3/00) · CPC title