Method and apparatus for application awareness in a network

Patent metadata

Field	Value
Publication number	US-10454895-B2
Application number	US-201615262861-A
Country	US
Kind code	B2
Filing date	Sep 12, 2016
Priority date	Feb 14, 2013
Publication date	Oct 22, 2019
Grant date	Oct 22, 2019

Abstract

A method for enforcing a network policy is described herein. In the method, a network socket event request from an application executing in a first context is intercepted by an agent prior to the request reaching a transport layer in the first context. A context refers to virtualization software, a physical computer, or a combination of virtualization software and physical computer. In response to the interception of the request, the agent requests a decision on whether to allow or deny the network socket event request to be communicated to a security server executing in a second context that is distinct from the first context. The request for a decision includes an identification of the application. The agent then receives from the security server either an allowance or a denial of the network socket event request, the allowance or denial being based at least in part on the identification of the application and a security policy. The agent blocks the network socket event from reaching the transport layer when the denial is received from the security server. In one embodiment, the method is implemented using a machine readable medium embodying software instructions executable by a computer.

First claim

What is claimed is:

1. A method for enforcing a network policy on an application executing within a first context, the method comprising:
intercepting, by an agent executing in the first context, a network socket event request from the application before the network socket event request reaches a transport layer located between a network layer and the application in a network stack of the first context;
sending, by the agent to a security server executing in a second context, a request for a decision on whether to allow or deny the intercepted network socket event, the request for the decision including application information comprising a domain of the application;
receiving, by the agent, the decision from the security server, the decision being an allowance or a denial of the network socket event request, the decision being based at least in part on the application information; and
preventing, by the agent, the network socket request from reaching the transport layer in the first context when the decision is the denial of the network socket event request.

2. The method of claim 1 ,
wherein the request for the decision further includes application information comprising an identification of a user of the application, an application file name, an application executable hash, and an application identifier.

3. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:
sending the network socket event request from the application in the first context to the transport layer in the first context.

4. The method of claim 1 ,
wherein the request for the decision further includes application information comprising an application file name, an application executable hash, and an application identifier.

5. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:
collecting statistics about data flow through the network socket of the first context;
sending the statistics from the first context, to a data collection module that receives statistics about data flows through multiple network sockets of multiple contexts; and
generating a report of the statistics about the data flows through the multiple network sockets of the multiple contexts.

6. The method of claim 1 , wherein the network event is any of: opening the network socket, closing the network socket, and listening to the network socket.

7. The method of claim 1 , wherein the application identifier is based on at least a process identifier that identifies (i) a process created when an operating system loads and runs an executable file of the application, and (ii) the executable file of the application.

8. The method of claim 1 , wherein a transport layer interface located between the transport layer and the application intercepts the network socket event, and the transport layer interface is a Transport Driver Interface.

9. The method of claim 1 , wherein the transport layer interface is a layered service provider that allows or blocks network socket event requests and resides above a base transport provider.

10. A non-transitory computer-readable medium with computer readable instructions executable by a context, comprising:
instructions that perform, intercepting, by an agent executing in the first context, a network socket event request from the application before the network socket event request reaches a transport layer located between a network layer and the application in a network stack of the first context;
instructions that perform, sending, by the agent to a security server executing in a second context, a request for a decision on whether to allow or deny the intercepted network socket event, the request for the decision including application information comprising a domain of the application;
instructions that perform, receiving, by the agent, the decision from the security server, the decision being an allowance or a denial of the network socket event request, the decision being based at least in part on the application information; and
instructions that perform, preventing, by the agent, the network socket request from reaching the transport layer in the first context when the decision is the denial of the network socket event request.

11. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 10 ,
wherein the application identifier is based on data received from an interface of the transport on the first context.

12. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 10 , further comprising:
instructions sending the network socket event request from the application in the first context to the transport layer in the first context.

13. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 10 , wherein the security module makes decisions on whether to allow or deny network socket events in multiple contexts.

14. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 10 , wherein the network event is any of: opening the network socket, closing the network socket, and listening to the network socket.

15. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 10 , wherein the transport layer interface is a layered service provider that allows or blocks network socket event requests and resides above a base transport provider.

16. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 12 , further comprising:
instructions collecting statistics about data flow through the network socket of the first context; and
instructions sending the statistics from the first context, to a data collection module that receives statistics about data flows through multiple network sockets of multiple contexts; and
instructions generating a report of the statistics about the data flows through the multiple network sockets of the multiple contexts.

17. A computer system, comprising:
an agent executing in a context;
a security server executing in a second context;
a firewall; and
a processor and memory with the context, the context executing:
instructions that perform, receiving, by the security server, a request from the for a decision on whether to allow or deny a network socket event request from an application, the network socket event request being intercepted by the agent before the network socket event request reaches a transport layer located between a network layer and the application in a network stack of the context, the request for the decision including application information comprising a domain of the application; and
instructions that perform, sending, by the security server, the decision to the firewall that enforces the decision, the decision being an allowance or a denial of the network socket event request, the decision being based at least in part on the application information, and wherein the denial prevents the network socket request from reaching the transport layer in the context.

18. The system of claim 17 , wherein the application information comprises an identification of a user of the application, an application file name, an application executable hash, and an application identifier.

19. The system of claim 17 , wherein the context further executes instructions that perform sending the network socket event request from the application in the context to the transport layer in the context.

20. The system of claim 17 , wherein the transport layer interface is a layered service provider that allows or blocks network socket event requests and resides above a base transport provider.

Assignees

• Vmware Inc

Inventors

• Feroz Azeem
• Chen Binyuan
• Chopra Amit

Classifications

• H04L63/168

  above the transport layer · CPC title

• G06F21/554

  involving event detection and direct action · CPC title

• H04L63/1441

  Countermeasures against malicious traffic (countermeasures against attacks on cryptographic mechanisms H04L9/002) · CPC title

• H04L63/1416

  Event detection, e.g. attack signature detection · CPC title

• H04L63/166

  at the transport layer · CPC title