Relational encryption for password verification

Patent metadata

Field	Value
Publication number	US-10129028-B2
Application number	US-201615040959-A
Country	US
Kind code	B2
Filing date	Feb 10, 2016
Priority date	Jul 13, 2015
Publication date	Nov 13, 2018
Grant date	Nov 13, 2018

Abstract

A method of equality verification using relational encryption including receiving a relational key that includes a first relational key component and a registration ciphertext that includes an encryption of a first plaintext data set. The method includes storing the registration ciphertext without decrypting the registration ciphertext. After the storing of the registration ciphertext, the method includes receiving an authentication request and communicating a safeguard data set that includes a random challenge in response to the authentication request. The method includes receiving an encrypted response that is generated based on the safeguard data set and a second plaintext data set. The method includes verifying a relationship between the encrypted response and the registration ciphertext using the relational key without decrypting the encrypted response and without decrypting the registration ciphertext. The relationship indicates that equality exists between the first and the second plaintext data sets.

First claim

What is claimed is:

1. A method of equality verification using relational encryption, the method comprising:
receiving, from a trusted entity server, a relational key that includes a first relational key component;
receiving, from a user computing system, a registration ciphertext that includes an encryption of a first plaintext data set;
storing, in a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium, the registration ciphertext without decrypting the registration ciphertext;
after the storing of the registration ciphertext, receiving, from the user computing system, an authentication request;
in response to the authentication request, communicating a safeguard data set that includes a random challenge to the user computing system;
receiving, from the user computing system, an encrypted response that is generated based at least partially on the safeguard data set and a second plaintext data set;
verifying, by each of a plurality of authentication servers, a relationship between the encrypted response and the registration ciphertext using the relational key without decrypting the encrypted response and without decrypting the registration ciphertext, the relationship indicating that equality exists between the first plaintext data set and the second plaintext data set;
communicating to the user computing system from one of the plurality of authentication servers an authentication signal indicative of whether there is equality between the first and second plaintext data sets in a case in which a combination of a first verification key assigned to the user computing system and a second verification key assigned to the one of the plurality of authentication servers permits access to a result of the verifying, and not communicating the authenticating signal to the user computing system in a case in which the combination of the first and second verification keys denies access to the result of the verifying, regardless of whether the authentication signal indicates that there is equality between the first and second plaintext data sets; and
receiving, from the trusted entity server, a public key set that includes a first public key, a second public key, a public hash key of a hash function, and the hash function,
wherein:
the relational key further includes a secret hash key of the hash function, and
the encrypted response is further based on one or more public hash key elements of the public hash key and a random test sample data set.

2. The method as claimed in claim 1 , further comprising:
receiving, from the trusted entity server, the first verification key by the user computing system; and
receiving, from the trusted entity server, the second verification key.

3. The method as claimed in claim 1 , wherein each of the first plaintext data set and the second plaintext data set includes a combination of a plurality of data items, or a plurality of segments of a single data item.

4. The method as claimed in claim 1 , wherein each of the first plaintext data set and the second plaintext data set is one of medical and biological information, technical information, and financial information.

5. The method as claimed in claim 4 , wherein the medical and biological information includes one of clinical data, health data, and genome data.

6. A non-transitory computer-readable medium having encoded therein programming code executable by one or a plurality of processors to perform or control performance of operations comprising:
receiving, from a trusted entity server, a relational key that includes a first relational key component;
receiving, from a user computing system, a registration ciphertext that includes an encryption of a first plaintext data set;
storing, in a non-transitory computer-readable storage media, the registration ciphertext without decrypting the registration ciphertext;
after the storing of the registration ciphertext, receiving, from the user computing system, an authentication request;
in response to the authentication request, communicating a safeguard data set that includes a random challenge to the user computing system;
receiving, from the user computing system, an encrypted response that is generated based at least partially on the safeguard data set and a second plaintext data set;
verifying a relationship between the encrypted response and the registration ciphertext using the relational key without decrypting the encrypted response and without decrypting the registration ciphertext, the relationship indicating that equality exists between the first plaintext data set and the second plaintext data set;
communicating to the user computing system an authentication signal indicative of whether there is equality between the first and second plaintext data sets in a case in which a combination of a first verification key assigned to the user computing system and a second verification key assigned to one of the plurality of processors permits access to a result of the verifying, and not communicating the authenticating signal to the user computing system in a case in which the combination of the first and second verification keys denies access to the result of the verifying, regardless of whether the authentication signal indicates that there is equality between the first and second plaintext data sets; and
receiving, from the trusted entity server, a public key set that includes a first public key, a second public key, a public hash key of a hash function, and the hash function,
wherein:
the relational key further includes a secret hash key of the hash function, and
the encrypted response is further based on one or more public hash key elements of the public hash key and a random test sample data set.

7. The non-transitory computer-readable medium as claimed in claim 6 , wherein the operations further comprise:
receiving the first and second verification keys from the trusted entity server.

8. The non-transitory computer-readable medium as claimed in claim 6 , wherein each of the first plaintext data set and the second plaintext data set includes a combination of a plurality of data items, or a plurality of segments of a single data item.

9. The non-transitory computer-readable medium as claimed in claim 6 , wherein each of the first plaintext data set and the second plaintext data set is one of medical and biological information, technical information, and financial information.

10. The non-transitory computer-readable medium as claimed in claim 9 , wherein the medical and biological information includes one of clinical data, health data, and genome data.

11. A method of equality verification of medical and biological information using relational encryption, the method comprising:
receiving, from a trusted entity server, a relational key that includes a first relational key component;
receiving, from a user computing system, a registration ciphertext that includes an encryption of a first plaintext data set related to medical and biological information;
storing, in a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium, the registration ciphertext without decrypting the registration ciphertext;
after the storing of the registration ciphertext, receiving, from the user computing system, an authentication request;
in response to the authentication request, communicating a safeguard data set that includes a random challenge to the user computing system;
receiving, from the user computing system, an encrypted response that is generated based at least partially on the safeguard data set and a second plaintext data set related to medical and biological information;
verifying, by each of a plurality of processors, a relationship between the encrypted response a

Assignees

• Fujitsu Ltd

Inventors

• Kamakari Ryota
• Shimoyama Takeshi
• Tsuda Hiroshi
• Yaginuma Yoshinori
• Mandal Avradip
• Roy Arnab
• MONTGOMERY Hart
• Ishiguro Toshiyuki
• Shigeta Kouhei

Classifications

• H04L9/3271

  using challenge-response · CPC title

• H04L63/0861

  using biometrical features, e.g. fingerprint, retina-scan (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication using biological data H04L9/3231) · CPC title

• H04L9/3242

  involving keyed hash functions, e.g. message authentication codes [MACs], CBC-MAC or HMAC · CPC title

• H04L63/08

  for authentication of entities (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication H04L9/32) · CPC title

• H04L9/3231

  Biological data, e.g. fingerprint, voice or retina (network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using biometrical features in a packet data network H04L63/0861) · CPC title