Methods and systems for bypassing authenticity checks for secure control modules

Patent metadata

Field	Value
Publication number	US-10038565-B2
Application number	US-201213722810-A
Country	US
Kind code	B2
Filing date	Dec 20, 2012
Priority date	Dec 20, 2012
Publication date	Jul 31, 2018
Grant date	Jul 31, 2018

Abstract

Methods and systems are provided for bypassing an authenticity check for a secure control module. In one embodiment, a method includes: receiving authenticity data from a secure source, wherein the authenticity data includes a signature and an identifier that is unique to the control module; programming the control module with the authenticity data; and bypassing the authenticity check of a control program of the control module based on the authenticity data.

First claim

What is claimed is:

1. A method of bypassing an authenticity check for a secure control module, comprising:
receiving authenticity data from a secure source, wherein the authenticity data includes a signature and an identifier (ID) that is unique to the control module;
programming the control module with the authenticity data; and
selectively bypassing the authenticity check of a control program of the control module when the signature of the authenticity data is valid and when the ID of the authenticity data matches an identifier of the control module, wherein the control program includes instructions that when executed by a processor control one or more components of a vehicle,
wherein the authenticity check authenticates a digital signature of the control program.

2. The method of claim 1 , further comprising combining the authenticity data with at least one file of the control program, and wherein the programming the control module with the authenticity data comprises programming the control module with the at least one file and the authenticity data.

3. The method of claim 1 , wherein the programming the control module with the authenticity data comprises storing the authenticity data as an authenticity application program in application memory.

4. The method of claim 3 , further comprising running the authenticity application program to erase a production boot program from boot memory and write a development boot program to boot memory.

5. The method of claim 4 , wherein the bypassing the authenticity check of the control program is performed by the development boot program.

6. The method of claim 1 , wherein the programming the control module with the authenticity data comprises storing the authenticity data in a designated memory location.

7. The method of claim 6 , wherein the bypassing the authenticity check of the control program comprises selectively bypassing the authenticity check of the control program when the authenticity data is stored in the designated memory location.

8. The method of claim 6 , wherein the designated memory location is in calibration memory.

9. The method of claim 6 , wherein the designated memory location is in a memory location that is not part of application memory and calibration memory.

10. The method of claim 1 wherein the authenticity data is programmed to the control module in the form of a file header.

11. The method of claim 1 wherein the authenticity data is programmed to the control module in the form of an application program.

12. The method of claim 1 wherein the authenticity data is programmed to the control module in the form of a security ticket.

13. A system for bypassing an authenticity check, comprising:
a secure control module that includes non-volatile memory and a processor; and
a control program that includes instructions that when executed by the processor control one or more components of a vehicle, and that includes authenticity data that is received from a secure source, that stores the authenticity data in the non-volatile memory, and that selectively bypasses the authenticity check of the control program when a signature of the authenticity data is valid and when an identifier (ID) of the authenticity data matches a unique identifier of the control module, wherein the authenticity check authenticates a digital signature of the control program.

14. The system of claim 13 , wherein the non-volatile memory is partitioned into at least boot memory, application memory, and calibration memory, and wherein the authenticity data is stored in application memory.

15. The system of claim 13 , wherein the non-volatile memory is partitioned into at least boot memory, application memory, and calibration memory, and wherein the authenticity data is stored in calibration memory.

16. The system of claim 13 , wherein the non-volatile memory is partitioned into at least boot memory, application memory, calibration memory, and authenticity memory, and wherein the authenticity data is stored in the authenticity memory.

Assignees

• Gm Global Tech Operations Llc

Inventors

• Alrabady Ansaf I
• Baltes Kevin M
• Rosa J David
• Forest Thomas M
• Wist Alan D

Classifications

• G06F21/572

  Secure firmware programming, e.g. of basic input output system [BIOS] · CPC title

• H04L9/3247 Primary

  involving digital signatures · CPC title

• H04L9/3281 Primary

  Electricity · mapped topic

• H04L9/3249 Primary

  using RSA or related signature schemes, e.g. Rabin scheme · CPC title

• G06F21/575 Primary

  Secure boot · CPC title